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Abstract 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in 2001 proposed to establish the Gulf Monetary Union (GMU) by 
2010. As we know it did not happen; however, negotiations have never been stopped and they plan to establish it in the 
near future. In the meantime authors have been busy in analyzing the feasibility (viability) of the GMU. This is a review 
article about the proposed GMU. It starts with the review of basic premise of the convergence criteria. It also reviews 
the studies on business cycle and shocks synchronization of the GCC countries. Researchers (based on their empirical 
evidence) differ in their opinions whether the GCC countries are yet to form the GMU. 
Keywords: business cycle, convergence, GMU, shock synchronization, SVAR  
1. Introduction 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a regional integration formed in 1981 by six oil exporting countries (Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) of the Arabian Gulf. When the GCC was formed, 
the countries in it aspired for a monetary union which is an economic union with a single common currency. This is 
because, as we know now, the highest form of a regional integration is a monetary union. Such aspiration seemed to be 
implanted before the formation of the GCC in 1981. El Kuwaiz (1988) reported that a futile attempt was taken in the 
period 1975 – 78 by the four GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE) to form a monetary coordination 
that would result in a common Gulf currency to be named as Gulf Dinar.  
With the creation of the GCC in 1981, the members agreed to enhance cooperation between monetary agencies and 
central banks, including an endeavor to establish a common currency in order to further their desired economic 
integration. However, there was little progress in the next two decades towards the intended integration process that 
would have paved the way to a common currency. In the meantime euro, the official currency of the euro zone (the 
European Union), was introduced in the beginning of 1999. This seemed to serve as a new impetus for the heads of the 
GCC countries. They met in Muscat (Oman) in December 2001 to lay down some concrete steps to launch a single 
currency in the beginning of 2010. Among the intended steps were to achieve high level of harmonization in all 
economic policies (fiscal, monetary, banking, and budgetary) among the member states.   
The GCC countries, except Kuwait, maintained de facto fixed exchange rates against the dollar for a long time (Khan, 
2009). To facilitate the monetary integration process, they have opted to maintain de jure pegged exchange rates against 
the US dollar from 2003. They also agreed to eliminate all tariff and non-tariff barriers of intra-GCC trade and from 
2003 started to treat any good as a national product as if it is produced by any GCC member state. Moreover, based on 
agreements among the GCC countries in 2001, a common tariff was introduced in 2003 that includes a common 
external customs tariff and common custom regulation.  
As a part of the economic agreement, the GCC countries launched the common market from the beginning of 2008. Due 
to the common market there is virtually no restriction on the mobility of goods, national labor and capital among the 
member countries. This shows their intent and we may say that since 2001 much progress has been made toward 
achieving the goal of the GCC monetary union. There have also been some unanticipated setbacks that may have 
contributed to the failure in establishing the GMU by 2010 as was originally planned. In 2007 Kuwait unilaterally 
moved from the dollar peg to an undisclosed currency basket. Oman in 2006 and the UAE in 2009 pulled out of the 
proposed monetary union. However, as we understand there have been ongoing negotiations to bring them back to the 
union and launch the common currency soon.  
This is a review article about the viability of the GCC monetary union (GMU) in relation to the theory of optimum 
currency area (OCA). By now a good number of papers have been written about the different aspects of the GCC 
monetary union. In this review I only concentrate on the viability or feasibility of the proposed GMU. In doing this I 
review the empirical results obtained and conclusion made. In some cases I provide theoretical background to 
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understand the empirical results and other cases when conclusions are based on discussions and tables, I provide some 
econometric evidence to support or refute the conclusions.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the theory and some empirical results of the 
OCA. This forms the background discussions for the GMU. Initial writings on the GMU focused on convergence 
criteria as laid in the OCA literature. Thus, section 3 reviews this literature. Sections 4 and 5 review the most recent 
writings on the viability of the GMU that have concentrated on computing and analyzing the business cycles and shocks 
synchronization. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. A Brief Review of the OCA 
Consider an area consists of two or more countries and they are closely integrated through international trade and factor 
movements. This area would be called an optimum currency area (OCA) if a single currency among its members which 
can be pegged or fluctuate only in unison against the rest of the world. The economic integration achieved through 
single currency has since been termed as currency or monetary union. The pioneers of the OCA (Mundell,1961, along 
with McKinnon, 1963, and Kenen,1969) have identified crucial criteria that economies must poses to form an OCA. 
These criteria are: wage (price) flexibility and labor mobility criteria (Mundell); the degree of openness (trade) and the 
size of an economy criteria (McKinnon); and the similarity of economic structures between two economies, the degree 
of product diversification and the level of fiscal integration criteria (Kenen). They have argued that the economies 
forming a currency union would be in better position to absorb the asymmetric shocks if these criteria are met. Thus 
these criteria are seen as a prerequisite to form a monetary union. For the next two decades till 1990s most writers on 
OCA have continued to analyze these criteria and have elaborated the costs and benefits associated with the currency or 
monetary union (Dellas and Tavlas, 2009).  
The costs and benefits of the monetary union have continually been evaluated. An extensive review of the costs and 
benefits of monetary union is now available in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010), Asonuma, et al., (2012), and Frankel 
(2013), among others. Obviously, by definition an individual member of a monetary union would not have autonomy in 
monetary policy. This is important because even under the monetary union an individual member country of the union 
would have different price, wage, and productivity structure that may require its own monetary policy to address its 
own economic problems. However, once in a monetary union the country would be unable to address it under the 
monetary union. Thus, the main cost of the monetary union would come from the loss of autonomy in monetary policy 
and along with it the loss of the exchange rate policy of the individual member countries. Moreover, once in a monetary 
union common fiscal constraints would be imposed that would limit the ability of the national governments to conduct 
their fiscal policies.  
However, the consensus is that benefits would outweigh costs. Most important benefits include: (1) the improvements 
resulting from the integration of goods, services and factors markets; (2) the elimination of the exchange rate risk for 
trade flows among the monetary union members; (3) the reduction of the transaction costs; and (4) the saving on 
international reserves because they will not be required to have international reserves for transactions with the currency 
area. Alesina and Barro (2002) have emphasized the added gains inherent in monetary union that by coordinating 
monetary and fiscal policies, the monetary union would bring a greater monetary and price stability which is considered 
as the prerequisite for economic growth.   
At the turn of the century, most writers on OCA have started to quantify the beneficial impacts of monetary union on 
trade and growth. Rose (2000) presented the first systematic (seminal) empirical study to quantify the impact of 
currency union on trade and his version of a gravity equation is reproduced in equation (1) for reference. 
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where ijX is the value of bilateral trade between countries i  and j , Y is the real GDP, Pop is population, D is 
the distance between countries (hence a gravity model), )(eV  is the volatility of bilateral exchange rate, Z is a vector 
of other dummy variables (specified in Rose, 2000) that include contiguity (common land border), regional trade 
agreement, common nation, common language, common nation, common colonies, colonization of country i by country 
j  and vice versa, and u  is the error term. However, the main variable in equation (1) is CU which is the common 
currency dummy (that is, countries use the same currency is assigned 1 and zero otherwise). Thus, the coefficient   
estimates the impact of currency union on trade flows. Using 186 countries, dependencies and territories with 33903 
observations and different specifications he has obtained an incredibly large positive impact of currency union on trade 
and concluded that the “countries with the same currency trade over three times as much with each other as countries 
with different currencies” (Rose 2000, p. 17).   
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Persson (2001) immediately showed his skepticism to this very large (more than 300 percent) impact of currency union 
on trade and questioned the econometric methodology used by Rose (2000). Subsequently many studies reestimated the 
trade impact of currency union on trade by addressing the econometric issues found wanting in Rose (2000) study (Rose 
and van Wincoop, 2001, Alesina et al., 2002, Rose and Stanley, 2005, Barro and Tenreyro, 2007, and Frankel, 2008, 
among others). Some of these studies found the positive impact of currency union on trade but not as large as found in 
Rose (2000) and some studies even found no trade impact. Rose (2009) has categorically rejected the hypothesis that 
the currency union has no trade effect by performing a meta-analysis using twenty-six recent studies on European 
countries and found that the EMU has increased trade inside Eurozone by at least 8% (and could be as large as 23%). 
After reviewing the literature on trade impact of currency union, S-Silva and Tenreyro (2010) have interesting 
observation that may be relevant to the GMU. They contend that countries which are geographically close, speaking the 
same language, and share former colonial links are more likely to form a currency union.  
Some other studies (Baldwin, 2006, Kelejian et al., 2011, among others) have used a version of gravity model (1) to 
estimate the impact of trade flows when the exchange rate volatility is eliminated in a monetary union. The argument is 
that member countries in a monetary union would eliminate exchange rate variability among the members and that 
would stimulate trade and economic growth. This means one would expect a significant negative estimate of  in 
equation (1). Most of the empirical studies mentioned above found an impact ranging between 5 to 10%. This beneficial 
trade and growth impact of a monetary union would be in the back of the mind of the proponents of the GMU.   
3. Issues of Convergence  
Economic convergence or simply convergence is an important issue in the OCA literature. Convergence indicates 
structural similarities between economies. If the economies aspiring for a monetary union meet the set out convergence 
criteria, it is argued that they would be able to absorb the asymmetric shocks hitting these economies. This section 
reviews whether the GCC countries fulfill the convergence criteria. The GCC member countries have agreed to five 
convergence criteria as a first step towards to form their monetary union. They are interest rates, reserves, inflation rates, 
fiscal balance, and public debt. These criteria are in accord with the traditional theory of the OCA and in the OCA 
literature in general.   
It is thought that convergence would be easily achieved if economies are integrated. Based on this idea some earlier 
studies investigated the state of integration of the GCC countries. For example, Dar and Presley (2001) studied the state 
of economic integration among the GCC countries measured by the volume of intra-GCC trade. We should mention that 
the GCC countries are a kind of homogenous unit. On the social side they speak one language and share a similar 
culture and tradition. On the economic side, they are all oil-exporters and their economies evolve around this oil sector. 
They have similar production, consumption, and development structures. As mentioned they all export oil and majority 
of their imports (including raw materials and most of the consumption items) come from outside the GCC countries. 
Thus, traditionally these countries have low intra-GCC trade. Thus, as recognized by Dar and Presley (2001), it is not 
surprising that there is a low level of integration measured by the intra-GCC trade. Laabas and Limam (2002) suggested 
that the GCC countries would achieve more intra-GCC trade by launching the GCC monetary union. Schaechter (2003) 
has emphasized for indirect benefits rather than direct benefits of the GMU which are still expected to be relatively 
small because of the insignificant intraregional trade among the GCC countries. According to him, the significant 
indirect benefits should come from the reinforcement of their present attempt of diversifying the economy, enhancing 
fiscal discipline across the membership and facilitating appropriate investment decisions across the GCC countries. 
However, the most important benefit would come from the financial and money markets integration. Financial and 
money market integration would increase the efficiency of the financial services which in turn would promote the 
growth of their non-oil GDP sector that they desperately in need (Schaechter, 2003).  
Darrat and Al-Shamsi (2005) performed cointegration analysis between GCC countries’ real GDP, inflation rates, 
financial markets, monetary policies, and found that these variables are cointegrated. This means the GCC countries 
share a common long-term trend, that is, their economic activities are linked through financial markets and monetary 
policies and only the socio-political differences preventing them to form a monetary union. Based on some ad-hoc 
arguments Echchabi et al. (2011) believe that the GCC monetary union will bring many benefits to the GCC countries.  
Buiter (2008) has offered the most dismal view. He finds no overwhelming economic reason for the GMU, but he finds 
overwhelming political arguments against the union: “Without anything approaching the free movements of goods, 
services, capital and persons among the six GCC member countries, the case for monetary union is mainly based on the 
small size of all GCC members other than Saudi Arabia, and their high degree openings. Indeed, even without the 
creation of a monetary union, there could be significant advantages to all GCC members, from both an economic and 
security perspective, from greater economic integration, through the creation of a true common market for goods, 
services, capital, labor and from deeper political integration” (Buiter 2008, p. 43). He brings a serious economic 
argument against the union using the example of the distortionary inflation tax (seigniorage). Because of the lack of the 
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sufficient-distortionary taxes in the GCC countries, seigniorage could be the sources of revenues for these governments 
and with monetary union they would loose this opportunity. He has argued that different national inflation rates among 
the GCC countries may be optimal, thus there is no case for the union. 
Other writers are more or less in favor of union and find integration is already in place. For example, Espinoza et al. 
(2010) find non-negligible integration by examining the regional financial integration in the GCC countries using 
capital flow data, interest rates, and equity prices. Sedik and Willams (2011) find that the GCC equity markets are not 
immune from global financial shocks and they find that spillovers from the US and regional markets impact 
significantly the GCC equity markets. Some others have suggested that monetary integration is also in place (Fasano, 
2003 and Nakibullah, 2011). The GCC countries use different indirect monetary policy instruments (such as open 
market operations using treasury bills and government development bonds, foreign exchange swap operations and repos, 
central bank certificates of deposits, reserve requirements) to manage their liquidity which is limited by their prevailing 
exchange rate regime and free capital mobility. They pursue a common goal of price stability by sterilizing the impact 
of international reserves (influenced mainly by oil price) on their monetary base to stabilize the domestic prices.  
Rutledge (2008) has compared six of the European Monetary Union’s Maastricht convergence criteria of exchange rates, 
foreign reserves, interest rates, inflation rates, fiscal deficits and debt with the GCC countries. Using the sample period 
1980 – 2006, he finds that only two criteria of exchange rate stability and interest rate convergence will be easy to 
achieve in the long run which is not surprising given their exchange rate arrangement. Though the exchange rates of 
Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 1980s and 1990s were officially (de jure) pegged to the Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR), they were effectively (de facto) fixed to the US dollar. From 1986 the Omani riyal has officially been 
pegged to the US dollar. Kuwait had maintained fixed but adjustable exchange rate between Kuwaiti dinar and a 
weighted basket of currencies; however, the dollar greatly dominated in the currency basket. They (including Kuwait) 
opted to maintain official or de jure pegged exchange rates against the US dollar in 2003 as a first step to their proposed 
monetary union. Given the exchange rates arrangement these countries have, it is not surprising that the criteria of 
exchange rate stability and interest rate convergence would easily be achieved as is evidenced in Rutledge (2008). 
Exchange rate stability and interest rate convergence are almost guaranteed. Next we look at the inflation rates 
convergence. As mentioned above it is one of the five convergence criteria agreed by the GCC countries in the Muscat 
meeting of 2001 and it is probably most important criteria for the GCC countries because the main stated monetary 
policy goal of the GCC counties is the price stability. The studies mentioned above have not analyzed this criterion 
properly. Here we look at this criterion more closely. Figure 1 shows the CPI inflation rates for the period 1976 – 2013. 
It shows that inflation has been low within the GCC countries, except early years and the spikes around 2008. 
Differences of inflation rates among the GCC countries are also evident from figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Figure 1. Inflation rates of the GCC countries, 1976 – 2013 
It is clear from figure 1 that the GCC countries have experienced episodes of high cross-sectional variation in inflation 
rates. Though there is an indication of convergence of inflation rate at the end of the sample, the question of long-run 
convergence of the inflation rates of the GCC countries remains relevant. Thus we test the long-run convergence of the 
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GCC inflation rates. Recently Phillips and Sul (2007) have suggested a test (log-t test) of long-run convergence. The 
Phillips and Sul’s log-t test is performed here to test the log-run convergence of the GCC inflation rates. They have 
recommended to use the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter (or HP filter) to filter out the cyclical component of a series and 
then work out with the filtered or trend component of the series to construct transition factor for each country and year 
( ith ) as follows: 
      



n
i
it
it
it
n
h
1
1


                         (2) 
where ij  in equation (2) is the filtered or trend component of a series of a country i at time .t  The transition path 
( ith ) of inflation rates for each GCC country is plotted in figure 2. Figure 2 shows two prominent blips at the end of 
both 1980s and 1990s. The inflation rates of Kuwait and the UAE at the end of 1980s were substantially above the GCC 
mean while the inflation rates of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia were substantially below the GCC mean. Along with Qatar, 
the inflation rates of the UAE again at the end of 1990s were substantially above the GCC mean whereas the inflation 
rates of Oman and Saudi Arabia were substantially below the GCC mean. This has caused a substantial cross-section 
variance blips at the end of 1980s and at the end of 1990s as we see in figure 3. The cross-sectional variance for each 
year is shown in figure 3 and it is constructed using the transition factors ( iijh ) of six countries.  
One interesting feature of the cross-sectional variance shown in figure 3 is that starting around the mid 1980s, 
cross-sectional variances of the GCC countries over the time have trending downward though there was a break at the 
trend in the mid-90s. Instead of this casual description, we perform the Phillips and Sul’s (2007) log-t test to see 
whether the GCC inflation rates are converging. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
Figure 2. Transition paths of the GCC inflation rates 
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Figure 3. Cross-sectional variance of the GCC inflation rates 
The Phillips and Sul test for convergence recommends trimming at least 20% of the sample at the origin. Following 
their suggestion we start the sample in 1985. The test results are presented in table 1. The dependent variable (DEP) in 
table 1 is DEP = –log(var) – 2log(log(t)) and the explanatory variable is log(t). Because the DEP is based on the 
negative log of the variance series, a significant positive coefficient on log(t) is evidence of convergence. Results in 
table 1 show that for the period 1985 – 2013 not only the coefficient of log(t) is positive but it is highly statistically 
significant indicating convergence. If we ignore the formal log(t) test as in table 1 and we look at figure 3, the 
cross-section variance for the last decade has been declining all the way to the end of the sample, though there is a little 
hint of reversion at the end. This suggests the inflation convergence criterion (considered as the most important criterion 
as far as the GCC countries are concerned) should not be a problem in forming the GCC monetary union.  
Table 1. Inflation convergence test results, 1985 - 2013 
DEP = –log(var) – 2log(log(t)) 
Variable Coefficient HAC Standard Error Probability 
Constant 
log(t) 
–5.049 1.552 0.003 
1.238 0.541 0.030 
The other two agreed convergence criteria of fiscal balance and public debt have special characteristics for the GCC 
countries as their fiscal balances are directly related to the oil revenues which fluctuate with the world oil price. 
Because of their wide variances of oil resources and sizes one expect the imbalances to vary and would not be 
stumbling block for the GMU. There is hardly any econometric study analyzing this criterion (see informal discussion 
in Al-Turki, 2007). 
4. Business Cycle Synchronization 
In assessing the feasibility of the GMU researchers have been examining the symmetry of the external shocks that these 
countries experience and by examining the business cycle synchronization. This section reviews empirical evidence 
based on business cycle synchronization. 
Researchers have been using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter to separate cyclical and trend components of a time 
series in order to study business cycles synchronization (see, for example, Al-Turki, 2007 and Ben Arfa, 2012). Once 
the cyclical components are obtained, correlations of the cyclical components are calculated. Positive significant 
correlation of the cyclical components is an indication of business cycle synchronization. The idea is that if the business 
cycles of the member countries are well synchronized macroeconomic policies would be most effective in absorbing the 
asymmetric shocks (Karras, 2006). One of the concerns of the monetary union is the loss of monetary autonomy. 
However, it is argued that if business cycles are well synchronized, convergence criteria are easily met and the loss of 
monetary autonomy does not pose a significant problem to a member country of a monetary union.  
Al-Turki (2007) and Ben Arfa (2012) have applied this approach for the GCC countries. Al-Turki’s (2007) has 
decomposed logarithms of real GDP of the GCC countries for the period 1980 – 2005 into trend and cyclical 
components using the HP filter and has computed the correlations of cyclical components. His results are not very 
supportive for the business cycles synchronization of the GCC countries for the whole sample period. Frankel and Rose 
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(1998) have pointed out that the business cycle synchronization may increase over time with the level of integration 
within a monetary union. The GCC countries are yet to announce the date of their integration but they have been taking 
steps toward it. Al-Turki (2007) has detailed many economic and structural changes that the GCC countries have 
undergone after the Gulf (Kuwait) war in 1990 – 1991. One of the changes all these countries have been trying to 
reduce dependence on oil and diversify their economies; that is their economic policies have been geared to accelerate 
the growth of the non-oil sector. Al-Turki (2007) has presented some evidence of such changes especially after the 
mid-nineteen nineties and have calculated correlation for the period of 1993 – 2005. He finds that business cycles of the 
GCC countries were synchronized for the period 1993 – 2005.  
Ben Arfa (2012) has studied the business cycle synchronization of four GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia) using real GDP for the period 1970 – 2007. He has offered no explanation of excluding the other two 
GCC countries. His results show that only Bahrain business cycle is correlated with other three GCC countries and has 
concluded that there is no business cycle synchronization of the GCC countries. Ben Arfa’s (2012) has extended data to 
1970s that seemingly improved the degrees of freedom; however, the early data in the sixties and seventies on GCC 
countries are not reliable (Summers and Heston, 1991). 
5. Shock Synchronization  
Researchers have also assessed the viability of actual or potential monetary union by identifying the structural shocks 
from a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models popularized by Blanchard and Quah (1989). Shocks are 
symmetric if structural shocks are positively correlated. With symmetric shocks it is more likely that a group of 
countries to form a monetary union. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) used Blanchard and Quah’s method to study the 
EMU. Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2008) is one of the first studies used this method for the GCC countries. They and 
most other studies (see for example, Al-Turki, 2007 and Ben-Arfa, 2012) on GCC countries have used two variables 
cases.  
To understand how this method works, let tX  is the vector of two dependent variables [ordered ty , tp ]  
where ty and tp are logarithm of real GPD and price level (GDP deflator) and they are first difference stationary. An 
infinite moving average representation of these variables can be written as: 
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where L is the lag operator and tu is the vector of independent white noise structural supply and demand shocks 
[ordered stu , dtu ]. In order to identify these structural shocks, researchers first estimate the reduced form VAR as:  
titittt eXBXBXBX   ...........2211          (4) 
where te is the vector of supply and demand residuals [ordered dtst ee , ] from an estimated reduced form VAR model 
(4) and B ’s in equation (4) represent 2x2 matrices of estimated coefficients from the VAR. Then using the idea that 
the VAR residuals te are composites of the pure innovations or structural shocks tu  as tt Cue  where 
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Once C matrix is identified, structural shocks are easily recovered as .1 tt eCu
  Four restrictions are needed to 
identify the four elements of the C matrix. Three of these restrictions are related to the variances and covariances of 
the structural shocks tu  and the fourth restriction coming from the standard macro aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply model. Following Blanchard and Quah (1989), the demand shocks are assumed to have only temporary effects 
on output but have permanent effects on prices. On the other hand, supply shocks have permanent (or long-run) effects 
on both output and prices. These assumptions imply 

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k
ka  in equation (3).   
Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2008) have used a SVAR model to analyze the potentiality of a GCC monetary union. They 
have used two variables SVAR model to identify the structural shocks in real GDP and the price level (GDP deflator) 
and have determined whether these shocks are symmetric or asymmetric. They find that supply shocks are asymmetric 
(no significant positive correlations) but demand shocks are in general symmetric. Asymmetric supply shocks are 
considered as the better indicators of costs of forming a monetary union. Based on this result and other empirical 
evidence such as non-synchronous short-run and long-run movements in real GDP of the countries, they conclude that 
the GCC countries are not yet ready to form a successful monetary union. Their results may have influenced by the 
choice of the sample period. Their data for some of the GCC countries extended to 1960s and the sample period for all 
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GCC countries ended in 2003. Summers and Heston (1991) in creating their world data series ignored GCC countries 
because they found their data in the sixties and the seventies are not reliable. Al-Turki (2007) has also used real GDP 
and GDP deflator to identify structural shocks using a SVAR model. His evidence, especially for the later period of 
1993 – 2005, on both counts of (supply and demand) shocks correlations and business cycles synchronization, offers 
support for the GMU. 
Some researchers have emphasized the importance of breaking the GDP of the GCC countries into oil and non-oil GDP 
because of their heavy dependence on oil and external shocks affect these two components differently.  For example, 
Louis et al. (2012) have used this approach using SVAR models as in Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader (2008) and  find that 
non-oil aggregate supply shocks are weakly symmetrical across the GCC countries. However, neither the aggregate 
demand nor aggregate supply shocks (as in Abu-Qarn and Abu-Bader, 2008) are symmetrical between the GCC 
countries. Based on these results they favor for the GMU. 
Benbouziane et al. (2010) generate shocks in a different approach (multivariate threshold autoregression). Based on 
their shock analysis they divide the GCC countries into two sub- groups where Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE are in one 
group and Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are in another group. They conclude that the GCC countries are still far 
from forming the GMU.    
Ben-Arfa (2012), using two variable SVAR model by excluding Oman and the UAE from the GCC countries, finds that 
supply shocks are asymmetric while demand  shocks are symmetric and has concluded the GCC countries are not 
ready to form the GMU. Kandil and Trabelsi (2012) have constructed four variables (ordered as world real output, 
domestic output, real exchange rates, and the price level) SVAR model using sample period of 1980 - 2006. Based on 
calculation of shocks synchronization, they conclude that the GCC countries are still far from forming a monetary union. 
They also suggest (based on their results) that Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have potential to take a lead in 
fostering a currency area. Similar to Kandil and Trabelsi (2012), Alshehry and Slimane (2013) construct a four variable 
SVAR model with world real GDP, real GDP, real effective exchange rate (REER) and price levels (GDP deflators) of 
the GCC countries using the sample period 1970 - 2010. They impose the obvious structural restriction that world real 
GDP is not affected by the other three variables in the model in the long run. They also impose the restrictions that 
domestic (GCC) real GDP is not affected by the domestic demand and monetary shocks in the long run. Finally, the 
monetary shocks do not affect any real variables in the model in the long run. They calculate correlation of various 
shocks (including demand and supply shocks) and also report the results of variance decomposition. They find that the 
correlations of large number of shocks are asymmetric (negative) which implies that the GCC are far from forming the 
GMU; however, contradictorily their variance decomposition results favor for the GMU.  
6. Conclusion 
The formation of the EMU has served as a catalyst in forming monetary or currency union in many parts of the world. It 
is reported that before the creation of the GCC in 1981, some members of the GCC aspired to establish a common 
currency. However, concrete steps were taken at the 2001 meeting in Oman so that GMU could be formed in 2010. As 
we know now that it did not happen; moreover, Oman and the UAE pulled out of the plan. Once the plan of the 
proposed GMU announced, researchers have been busy in discussing and analyzing the viability of the GMU.  
This paper has reviewed some aspects of the GMU. In particular, the paper considers the convergence criteria in the 
areas of exchange rates, interest rates, and inflation rates. Exchange rates among the GCC countries have remain stable 
which is even remarkable given these countries have relatively open capital accounts. Because of their fixed exchange 
rates against the US dollar, interest rates of the GCC countries have moved broadly in parallel with the US interest rates 
and there is a narrow spread across the GCC countries. Historically, inflation rates remain low and under control though 
at times some of them experienced higher inflation; for example, Qatar and the UAE experienced a higher inflation 
rates in recent times compared to other GCC countries.  A formal test of convergence for inflation rates shows 
convergence. Thus, the GCC countries more or less have met those criteria agreed in 2001. 
It is argued that if business cycles and structural shocks are synchronized among the members of a monetary union, the 
loss of monetary autonomy would be minimal in forming a monetary union. Thus, the paper also reviews the empirical 
works on business cycles and structural shocks synchronization of the GCC countries.  Results are mixed whether the 
GCC countries have been experiencing symmetric or asymmetric shocks. Thus, there is no consensus among the 
researchers whether the GCC countries are ready to form the GMU. However, this should not discourage to form the 
GMU because synchronized shocks are achieved with more integration. 
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